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THE DEREGULATION OF BANKS
H. HELM U LoRiNGt
JAm~s M. BRUNDYT
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite what politicians and competitors may claim to the contrary, the
fact remains that banks in the United 'States have not been deregulated. The
geographical and functional scope of bank activities has remained essentially
unchanged for many decades. Only the interest rates banks may pay on
certain types of deposits have been deregulated. This poorly understood
distinction clouds the current debate over banking policy. This article de-
scribes the deregulation that has occurred and some of its effects, surveys
the regulations that still exist, and suggests how the unfinished process of
bank deregulation should be completed in the public interest.'
II. THE CURRENT STALEMATE
The 98th Congress adjourned without action to reform the powers of
banks and bank holding companies (BHCs). Although the House and Senate
Banking Committees, the Reagan Administration, the federal banking reg-
ulatory agencies, and large segments of the banking industry all supported
certain reforms, the changes on which a consensus existed would merely
have added new restrictions. Philosophical differences separating the inter-
ested parties prevented any action on deregulation of bank and BHC
activities.
2
t LL.B., Univ. of California, Berkeley (1956); M.A., Univ. of California, Berkeley
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1. For a succinct and expert analysis of the economics of bank deregulation, see CorNcr
OF ECONoMc ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRE SDENT 145-74 (1984).
2. Objections to broader securities powers of commercial banks became the principal
obstacle to enactment of the bill. See 130 CONG. REc. S11117-30 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984);
Letter from Representative Dingell to House Speaker O'Neill (September 26, 1984) (opposing
consideration of the Senate-passed bill in the House). But see Note, Restrictions on Bank
Underwriting of Corporate Securities: A Proposal For More Permissive Regulation, 97 HARV.
L. REv. 720 (1984).
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The Senate, under the leadership of Senator Jake Garn, adopted an
omnibus banking bill which reinforced the existing limitations on BHC
activities and closed the so-called "loopholes" that securities, insurance and
other non-banking companies have used to facilitate their engaging in the
banking business, and which BHCs have begun to use to avoid to some
extent the geographic limitations imposed by the Douglas Amendment.3 The
bill also prohibited BHCs from using state-chartered banks to expand their
involvement in the insurance business.4 That is, the bill closed the "non-
bank bank" 5 and "South Dakota ' 6 loopholes in the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 (BHC Act).7 In addition, the Senate bill offered BHCs limited
additional powers to deal in and underwrite municipal revenue bonds,
mortgage-backed securities, and commercial paper. 8 It removed a few minor
limitations on activities of BHCs, made numerous other amendments to the
statutory structure regulating banks, savings and loan associations and their
holding companies, and authorized the states to enact reciprocal legislation
establishing exclusive interstate regions within which BHCs could acquire
banks and other BHCs.
9
By contrast, the House Banking Committee adopted a bill that would
have closed all of the "loopholes" without giving banks and BHCs any
additional powers.' 0 The Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer
Protection and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce
adopted a similar, even more stringent bill." In the end, the 98th Congress
was unable to achieve a consensus on whether bank and BHC powers should
be expanded, contracted, or left unaltered.
The current stalemate may reflect public opinion. Some polls suggest
that there is little public support for expanded bank powers, although the
misinformation and disinformation disseminated on these issues makes it
hard to assess the weight to be accorded such survey results.' 2 This stalemate
leaves unresolved the imbalance that has increasingly troubled the banking
industry since the process of banking "deregulation" began in the late 1970s.
This process has lifted many of the restrictions that have been imposed since
the enactment of the Banking Act of 193311 on the interest rates that banks
could pay on their liabilities, especially smaller deposits. However, "dere-
gulation" has reduced significantly neither the severe restrictions on activities
3. See S. 2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); see also infra note 57.
4. See S.2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
5. See infra text accompanying note 95.
6. See infra note 127.
7. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1982).
8. See S.2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
9. See id.
10. See H.R. 5916, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
11. See H.R. 5881, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
12. See New Poll Looks at Consumer Attitudes on Changing Financial Services, American
Banker, Oct. 20, 1984, at 3.
13. Act of June 16, 1933 (Banking Act of 1933), § 11(b), 48 Stat. 181-82 (1933) (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 371(a), (b) (1982)).
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permissible for banks and BHCs nor the limits imposed by the McFadden
Act 4 and the BHC Act on the geographic areas in which banks and BHCs
may conduct permitted banking activities.
III. DEREGULATION OF DEPOSIT INTEREST RATES
Thd Banking Act of 1933 prohibited the payment of interest by member
banks of the Federal Reserve System on demand deposits'5 and authorized
the Federal Reserve Board (Board) to set the maximum rates of interest that
member banks could pay on time deposits. 6 Under this authority the Board
issued its Regulation Q, which defines the types of time deposits banks may
issue and sets the maximum rate of interest banks may pay on such deposits.'
7
Subsequent legislation and regulation extended similar limitations to all
federally-insured banks and savings and loan associations.'"
Until the mid-1960s, the legal limitations in interest rates payable on
time deposits had little practical impact on the banking business, since
market interest rates were generally below the Regulation Q ceiling. '9 Comm-
encing in the mid-1960s, inflation led to rising interest rates that soon
exceeded the ceiling rates mandated by Regulation Q. A "regulatory spread"
developed between the cost of these deposits to banks (and other depository
institutions) and the market-determined rates at which the deposits could be
lent. The pre-existing regulatory spread on interest-free demand deposits
increased.
Holders of larger deposits generally were able to avoid the restrictions
on deposit rates.20 These depositors received many services from banks at
prices below cost and could invest at money market rates balances unused
to compensate the banks for those services. Smaller deposits, usually called
"consumer deposits," remained subject to the Regulation Q interest rate
restrictions. Because the regulatory spread and the innate stability of con-
sumer deposits made these deposits highly profitable, depository institutions
competed vigorously for them.
14. See 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982).
15. See id. § 371(a).
16. See id. § 371(b).
17. 12 C.F.R. §§ 217-217.160 (1984).
18. The Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation established the
maximum rates payable by insured non-member banks. See 12 U.S.C. §§1819, 1828 (1982); 12
C.F.R. § 329 (1984). The Federal Home Loan Bank did so for federally-insured savings and
loan associations 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 526 (1984). Aside from a differential in
favor of savings and loan association and savings banks, the limitations on all types of
institutions were nearly the same as, and came to be called, Regulation Q after the Board's
regulation.
19. During all of the period prior to November 24, 1964, the Regulation Q limit never
exceed 4%, and Treasury bill rates were rarely that high. See BD. OF GovRNORS OF THE FED.
REsERvE Sys., BANUKIN AND MONTARY STATISTICS 1941-1970, Table 12.4 at 673 and Table 12.7
at 693 (1976).
20. All restrictions on interest rates on time deposits in excess of $100,000 were suspended
May 16, 1973. See BD. OF GovERNos OF Tim FED. REsmWv Sys., ANN. STATISTICAL DIG., 1971-1975,
Table 8 at 328 n. 4 (1976).
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Since the institutions could not compete in terms of interest rates, they
offered goods and services instead. Depending on the size of the customer's
deposit, the goods offered ranged from scenic checks and toy animals to
other more valuable premiums. Services included "free" checking accounts
and assistance in balancing the customer's checkbook. Most importantly,
banks saturated their market areas with offices (where permitted) in order
to offer their customers as much convenience as possible. In the phrase most
often used to describe this behavior, banks (and other depository institutions)
"competed with brick and mortar."
To be sure, there are a variety of reasons for banks to establish many
offices. For example, branching allows a desirable diversification of both
assets and liabilities, which, if properly managed, can increase significantly
a bank's stability. Long before Regulation Q became binding, banks in states
permitting branch banking had established substantial branch networks. In
California, which has authorized statewide branch banking by statute since
1909,21 Bank of America had more than 500 branches before the inception
of interest-rate regulation.2
Nonetheless, the evidence strongly suggests that banks offered their
consumer and small business customers convenience as a major method of
competition after the mid-1960s.Y In 1960, when low market interest rates
made Regulation Q ineffective, there were 1750 banking offices in California,
or one for each 8981 residents. By 1979 the number of offices had increased
to 4321, or one office for each 5478 California residents counted in the 1980
census. Similar results emerge for every state, although the increase in the
number of offices generally was more pronounced in states permitting branch
banking than in those committed to unit banking. For example, in 1960
Illinois had 966 banking offices, or 10436 residents per office, while in 1979
the state had 1734 offices, or one office for each 6585 Illinois residents
counted in the 1980 census.24
Deregulation of consumer time-deposit interest rates began in 1978, when
the Board authorized a certificate of deposit with an interest rate limited by
the rate determined in the weekly Treasury bill auction and a maturity of six
months.25 To slow the rate at which consumers converted from interest-rate
controlled deposits to the new certificate, the Board set the certificate's
minimum denomination at $10,000.26 Despite this large minimum deposit,
21. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 500 (West 1909).
22. BankAmerica Corp., 1969 ANNUAL REPORT 32 (1970).
23. See Keeley and Zimmerman, Deregulation and Bank Profitability, FED. RESERVE BANK
OF SAN FRANciscO WEEKLY LETTER, July 14, 1984; see also Keeley, Interest-Rate Deregulation,
FED. RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANcIscO WEEKLY LETTER, Jan. 13, 1984.
24. See DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, GEOGRAPIC RESTRiCTIONS ON COMMERCIAL BANKING IN
THE U.S., THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, Table 2.2 at 39 and Table 2.3, at 31 (January 1981)
(hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S REPORT) (number of branches); DEPT. OF COMMEARCE, BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S., at 17 (1982) (population statistics).




the amount invested in these less-regulated certificates grew to approximately
$178 billion by the end of 1980.27 During this period, the amount held in
savings deposits decreased by approximately $20 billion. 28 In effect, customers
began to move their funds from accounts subject to a substantial regulatory
spread to accounts with a much lower spread.
This trend accelerated as Merrill, Lynch and Co. develQped the Cash
Management account and money market mutual funds (MMMFs) became
popular. MMMFs offered investors the capability to withdraw funds on
demand from accounts bearing interest at a market-determined rate. By
December 1982, these funds held total assets of about $233 billion. 29 The
MMMFs invested a substantial proportion of these assets with depository
institutions, purchasing large-denomination certificates of deposit that were
not subject to Regulation Q. In effect, MMMFs permitted consumer depos-
itors to avoid the regulatory spread imposed by Regulation Q and to earn a
market-determined rate of interest on their liquid investments.
From December 1979 to December 1982, rate-regulated savings deposits
at all depository institutions fell by more than $50 billion, and small-
denomination time deposits increased significantly less rapidly than the rate
of inflation. Liabilities upon which depository institutions had earned a
substantial regulatory spread ceased to grow, and indeed, decreased when
adjusted for inflation. During the same period, large-denomination certifi-
cates of deposit exempt from interest rate controls grew by nearly $110
billion.3 0
Faced by this shift away from rate-regulated accounts, depository insti-
tutions demanded the authority to compete on equal terms with the new
consumer savings vehicles that were not subject to Regulation Q. Congress
responded by creating the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee
(DIDC) in 1980, 3' charged with eliminating interest-rate controls over a
period of six years. In 1981, after considerable delay caused in large part by
the lack of consensus among depository institutions regarding the best way
to accomplish interest-rate deregulation, the DIDC adopted a phased plan
for removing interest-rate ceilings by the statutory deadline.
32
By mid-1982, however, high and volatile interest rates had convinced
many depositors that the flexibility and high rates that could be earned on
even relatively small balances held with MMMFs offset their lack of federal
27. See BoARD OF GovERNoRs OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., STATISTICAL RELEASE E.3.4
(July 14, 1981).
28. See FDIC, BANK OPERATING STATISTICS, 1978 and 1980, Table A.
29. See 70 FED. RES. BULL. A13, Table 1.21 (July, 1984) at A13.
30. See BOARD OF GOVENoRS OF TnE FED. RESERE SYs., ANN. STATISTICAL Di., 1970-
1979, Table 13.B at 67 (1981) (1979 data); 70 FED. RES. BULL. A13, Table 1.21 (July, 1984)
(1982 data).
31. The DIDC was created by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132, (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§
3501-24 (1982)).
32. See 12 C.F.R. § 1204.115 (1984).
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deposit insurance and the inconvenience of dealing with a distant MMMF
by mail or wire transfer of funds.
Since the DIDC had proved incapable of creating an instrument fully
competitive with the MMMFs, depository institutions demanded one from
Congress. The Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 198231 in-
structed the DIDC to create such an instrument, which the DIDC did,
effective December 14, 1982.14 The Money Market Deposit Account (MMDA)
that the DIDC authorized offered depository institutions a highly effective
mechanism for competing with the MMMFs. Commercial banks alone had
issued more than $230 billion in MMDAs at the end of 1983. A portion of
the MMDA deposits was withdrawn from MMMFs, whose assets declined
by more than $55 billion in a year. Some MMDA deposits converted from
rate-regulated accounts. From year-end 1982 to the end of the first quarter
of 1984, the seasonally adjusted amount of rate-regulated savings accounts
at commercial banks declined by $36 billion.1
5
At the same time that it authorized MMDAs, the DIDC also created the
"Super-NOW" account upon which depository institutions could pay unre-
gulated interest rates, while customers could make unlimited withdrawals by
negotiable order of withdrawal.3 6 This account also proved successful, though
less so than the MMDA. At the end of 1983, $29.5 billion had been deposited
in Super-NOW accounts, 37 presumably much of it transferred from the rate-
controlled NOW accounts that Congress had authorized nationwide in 198038
or from consumer demand deposit accounts upon which interest remains
prohibited.
When the DIDC amended its regulations in October 1983 to eliminate
all rate controls on time deposits with maturities greater than one month,
the erosion of the regulatory spread continued. At the same time, the DIDC
reduced in phases the minimum balance required to qualify for deregulated
accounts from $2,500 to zero by January 1, 1986. 39 After March 31, 1986,
no regulations will control consumer deposit interest rates, although the
33. Pub. L. No. 97-320, Title III, § 327 96 Stat. 1501; (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503(c)
(1982)).
34. See 12 C.F.R. § 1204.122 (1984).
35. 70 FED. REs. BULL. A13, Table 1.21 (July, 1984). If this amount converted from
savings deposits to MMDAs earning at least 9% annually, commercial bank interest expense
increased by at least $1.26 billion. From December, 1982 to December, 1983 the same table
shows at line 41 that large time deposits at commercial banks declined by $37.2 billion. See id.
These certificates tend to bear a higher interest rate than MMDAs. This shift to lower-cost
MMDA's undoubtedly helped to offset the additional expense from the savings deposit shift.
36. See 12 C.F.R. § 1202.122 (1984). Drafts drawn on NOW accounts function like checks
drawn on demand deposits. However, the drawee institution reserves the right to require notice
of withdrawal on NOW drafts and is not legally bound to pay the draft immediately upon
presentation. See infra text accompanying note 99.
37. See 70 FED. Ras. BuLL. A13, Table 1.21, Line 12 (July, 1984).
38. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-
221, Title III, § 303, 94 Stat. 146 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1982)).
39. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 1204.108, 1204.121-24 (1984) (new time deposit regulations).
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prohibition on the payment of interest on demand deposits will remain in
effect, and deregulated transaction (NOW and Super-NOW) accounts will
continue to be unavailable to corporations. 40
A. Effects of Interest-Rate Deregulation
The new accounts authorized by the Garn-St Germain Act and the
deregulation of interest rates on time deposits were a mixed blessing for
depository institutions. They provided an effective and necessary competitive
tool to stem the hemorrhage of consumer deposits out of the banking system,
but they further eroded the regulatory spread. As previously described, when
the regulatory spread emerged, depository institutions tended to expend a
portion of it to increase the quantity of convenience and service they
provided, in part by increasing the number of their offices. As the regulatory
spread diminishes, this process will tend to reverse itself, unless other means
develop to keep branch systems profitable at their current scope. Branches
and unit banks created primarily as mechanisms for competing by brick and
mortar may have to retrench.
Depository institutions have taken a variety of steps to respond to erosion
of the regulatory spread, steps designed to enhance the profitability of their
existing delivery systems. By consolidating branches and introducing greater
automation, banks have attempted to reduce the unit costs of providing
many banking services. They have increased service charges and have begun
to charge for services that customers received without explicit charge in the
past.
Depository institutions also have sought to obtain whatever economies
of scale and benefits of diversification may be gained from consolidations,
mergers and acquisitions. This trend may be expected to continue in states
which permit such activity. The number of banking offices may decrease
somewhat, as banks substitute interest-rate competition for competition with
brick and mortar. The need for diversification of deposit and loan portfolios
should motivate some unit banks to consolidate with branch bank or BHC
systems, and the proportion of banking assets held by multi-office systems
should increase. 4' Increased geographic diversification would help to stabilize
bank earnings streams as the regulatory spread erodes. Of course, the
statutory restrictions on branching and interstate banking discussed in detail
below severely limit opportunities for such diversification.
Banks and BHCs also have sought to broaden their activities to include
financial services not perceived as traditional banking services, such as:
insurance brokerage and agency, real estate brokerage, financial data proc-
essing and software production, securities brokerage, insurance and securities
underwriting, and real estate development. However, attempts to gain au-
40. See 12 U.S.C. § 1832 (1982).
41. C. H. GOLEMBE & Assocs., THE REGULATION OF BANK SIZE, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS
AND FUTURE PROSPECTS (1984) at 90-103; see also FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA, INTERSTATE
BANKINIG, ECON. REV., (May 1983).
1985]
WASHINGTONAND LEE LA WREVIEW
thority for new activities that depository institutions could deliver conveni-
ently through their existing branch systems have been unsuccessful, by and
large, even though it seems obvious that depository institutions could gain
economies of scope by using existing delivery systems to provide additional
services with greater convenience to customers. We examine below the
restrictions and limitations that the current statutory and regulatory structure
imposes on commercial banks and BHCs that wish to enter these fields.
B. Bank Capital Rules
As we have shown, "deregulation," to date, has meant simply elimina-
tion of the regulatory spread. At the same time, banks have been subjected
to an additional regulatory burden, that of enhanced capital requirements.
The impact of deregulation occurred just as banks were struggling to manage
the effects of a severe and prolonged recession. Perhaps partially to offset
the effect of these factors on their return on equity, banks have permitted
their capital ratios to decline over the past few years. In 1970 the average
regulatory capital of U.S. banks was about 8.7 percent of total assets. 42 By
the end of 1983, this ratio had declined to about 6.5 percent for banks with
total assets exceeding $100 million.
43
In response to this decline, the federal bank regulatory agencies issued
guidelines for BHC and bank capital in 1981." In June 1983, the Board and
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) for the first time
applied the guidelines to the seventeen very large "multinational" banks and
BHCs. 41 In August, 1984 the regulators proposed that the capital guidelines
be uniform for all sizes of banks and that the required minimum level of
total capital be 6 percent of total assets. 46
In the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, 47 Congress granted
42. The average regulatory capital ratio of U.S. banks is the ratio of "total capital
accounts plus total reserves" to "total assets". BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE
Sys., BANyiNO AND MONETARY STATISTiCS 1941-1970 418, Table 6.11 (1976).
43. For 1983, the average regulatory capital ratio of U.S. banks was calculated as the
ratio of the sum of line 108 "total equity capital", Line 109 "preferred stock", line 26
"allowance for possible loan losses", and line 27 "allocated transfer risk reserves" divided by
line 1 "total assets". 70 FED. RES. BULL. A66-A67, Table 4.20 (June, 1984).
44. Joint Press Release of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve
Board, FED. BANKiNG L. REP. (CCH) 5462 (Dec. 17, 1981). The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation separately adopted guidelines for capital adequacy for insured non-member banks.
46 Fed. Reg. 62693 (1981).
45. Joint Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (June 13, 1983). The Federal Reserve Board reviewed and
reaffirmed the June, 1983 amendments to the capital adequacy guidelines in a Federal Reserve
press release. See Federal Reserve Press Release (Dec. 1, 1983).
46. The proposals of the three regulators differ slightly. For the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation proposal, see 49 Fed. Reg. 29399 (1984); for the Federal Reserve Board proposal,
see 49 Fed. Reg. 30317 (1984); for that of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, see
49 Fed. Reg. 34838 (1984).
47. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-12 (1982).
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the regulatory agencies broad authority to impose particular capital ratios.4 1
This new authority has been used, thus far, to impose capital requirements
that wholly lack theoretical justification. The regulators have never presented
an analytical basis to justify a particular level of capital as adequate.4 9 On
the contrary, the regulators' reasoning seems to be that the industry as a
whole currently has a- capital level of around 6 percent of total assets; that
the capital level should not decline further; and that the regulators can draw
no principled distinction between large and small banks. The regulatory
agencies have never addressed the question of why the level of capital should
not further decline, if financial markets would permit it to do so.
Nevertheless, there must be some intuitive agreement among all con-
cerned that, given the aftermath of the domestic recession, the decline in
energy prices, and the Third World debt problems, some enhanced equity
cushion may be desirable for the safety of the federal deposit insurance fund
and uninsured depositors.50 Specific capital ratios also offer the regulators a
means to control the growth of banks as Regulation Q authority disappears.
If the regulators wish to promote financial intermediation through banks,
they can tolerate lower capital ratios. If they wish to restrict lending of the
types in which banks specialize, they can increase the capital requirements.
The banking regulators appear to perceive deregulation, namely, the
elimination of the regulatory spread, as increasing the risk of bank failure.
In some measure, this is probably true, since the earnings afforded by that
spread probably tended to be more stable than the earnings available in an
environment where money markets determine the rates banks must pay on
their liabilities. 5' Even if this is true, the reason why possible increased
variability in bank earnings requires additional bank capital remains elusive.
A bank's capital is not its first line of defense against insolvency. A
substantial and stable revenue stream and a high level of liquidity afford far
better protection against failure. Banks in some foreign countries, for
instance, Japan, operate with significantly less capital than that which the
regulators have required U.S. banks to maintain.5 2 Savings and loan associ-
48. Id. § 3907.
49. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674
(5th Cir. 1983); see also Staff Memorandum to Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Regulations Establishing Procedures for Adherence to Board's Capital Adequacy
Guidelines (July 20, 1984).
50. The question of deposit insurance is addressed in the last part of this article.
51. A recent study concluded, however, that the regulatory actions taken through May,
1978 to reduce interest-rate restrictions had no significant effect on bank solvency risk, as
perceived by financial markets. Smirlock, An Analysis of Bank Risk and Deposit Rate Ceilings,
13 J. MONETrARy EcoN. 195 (1984).
52. See The Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd. (BanCal Tristate), 70 FED. Ras. BuLL. 518 (1984). In
the Mitsubishi Bank opinion the applicant covenanted to maintain capital of the acquired U.S.
bank at a ratio higher than that required of the applicant. See id. at 519. Governors Martin
and Rice dissented from this order because of concern over the capital adequacy of the
applicant. See id. at 520; see also Bank of Montreal (Harris Bancorporation), 70 FED. RES.
BULL. 664, 667 (1984) (Partee, Governor, dissenting).
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ations and federal savings banks in the United States may operate with much
less capital than commercial banks, despite the fact that these institutions
have powers similar to those of commercial banks.
3
The capital requirements imposed by the federal bank regulators gener-
ally will increase the cost of engaging in the banking business, since a bank
must obtain more capital to support each asset added to the balance sheet.
The cost of capital, net of tax effects, typically exceeds the cost of debt.
Thus, the higher the capital requirement, the greater the cost of funding
assets. Especially since its efficacy is quite dubious, it seems unfortunate that
the federal bank regulators have imposed this additional cost burden on
banks. Banks may be tempted to take counter-productive actions to adapt
to these requirements.
C. Bank Responses to Increased Capital Requirements
With the regulatory spread diminished, banks require additional sources
of income in order to generate adequate returns to attract the capital
necessary to support the growth of the business. Banks must strive to balance
their portfolios to achieve an expected rate of return, on whatever level of
capital the regulators may require, that approximates that expected on
alternative investments with comparable risk. Bank management can seek
the necessary additional income in two principal ways: by managing existing
and additional activities to increase revenues and by increasing the risk of
the existing activities, that is, by investing in riskier assets. Of course, bank
management generally will follow both avenues.
Heightened capital requirements may add to the pressure on banks and
BHCs to stress activities upon which they can earn fee income in order to
increase revenues without increasing assets. It also will tend to induce banks
to eliminate less profitable activities. Management can redeploy the capital
invested in those activities to more profitable lines. Even if a line of business
is not discontinued, banks may limit it to the most profitable geographic and
demographic market segments. For this reason, increases in capital requirements
mandated by the regulators may compel banks and BHCs to reduce the level
of their service to their communities. The capital requirements certainly will
cause increases in charges for bank services.
If regulations restrict additional activities as revenue sources, the incen-
tive becomes greater for banks to increase the risk of their bank portfolios.
A regulatory capital adequacy requirement actually may reduce the stability
of an institution's income stream by creating this additional incentive to
make high-risk, high-return investments. Other things being equal, higher
capital requirements should not lessen significantly the frequency of bank
failures.
53. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has proposed rules to enforce more strictly the
requirement that federally-insured savings and loan associations achieve a capital level of 3%
and to restrain excessive growth. See 50 Fed. Reg. 6891 (1985).
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D. Geographic and Functional Deregulation as an Alternative to
Enhanced Capital Requirements
It appears to the authors that expanded functional and geographic powers
for banks and BHCs may in many instances provide both additional earning
power and stability to support bank capital growth and may reduce the
incentive to invest in higher-risk assets that capital requirements create.
Functional and geographical diversification could provide the larger revenue
stream and greater liquidity that are the true supports for both depositors
and stockholders. Any new powers should emphasize those financial services
which existing bank and BHC delivery systems can provide conveniently and
efficiently. Permitted geographic expansion should allow utilization of tech-
nology already in place serving existing branch systems to support expanded
service areas. New services should not call for management skills appreciably
different from those banks now possess.
Studies have shown that a number of the financial services activities that
banks and BHCs have sought to enter either have earnings less variable than
those of traditional banking activities, such as insurance agency, brokerage
and service, and life insurance underwriting, or possess revenue streams that
tend to move counter-cyclically to those of traditional banking services,
namely those conducted by banks acting as securities broker/dealers, savings
and loan associations, and in a real estate capacity other than lessor,
subdivider and builder. 54 Other activities proposed seem to show both greater
variability of earnings than and a pro-cyclical relationship with traditional
banking activities. These include real estate development, leasing and man-
agement, and property and casualty insurance underwriting."5 It is possible
that these last activities are inherently more profitable than traditional
commercial banking. Based on the evidence, it appears that the authority to
54. See Wa 11 and Eisenbeis, Risk Considerations in Deregulating Bank Activities, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA EcoN. REv., (May 1984), at 15; see also Embersit and Quinn,
Financial Motives For Mixing Financial Services, American Banker, April 26, 1984, at 4. With
the exception of property and casualty insurance underwriting, banks and BHCs already engage
in these services to a limited extent in the United States or abroad. See, e.g., Federal Reserve
Board Press Release, Dec. 4, 1984, (concerning Citicorp). None of these activities calls for
managerial resources substantially different from those which banks and BHCs already possess.
Diversifying into these businesses would not create conglomerates of the type in fashion during
the 1960s. But see Rhoades, The Implications for Bank Merger Policy of Financial Deregulation,
Interstate Banking, and Financial Supermarkets, BoARD oF GOVERNORS OF Ta FED. RESERVE
Sys. STAFF STuDy No. 137 (1984). The analogy Mr. Rhoades draws between industrial conglom-
erates and expanded financial services powers for banks and BHCs is faulty. The industrial
conglomerates relied for their success on financial and managerial synergies that often proved
illusory. Broader financial services powers for banks and BHCs would simply permit delivery
of greater volume through existing distribution systems, driving down unit costs of delivery for
all of the services.
55. See supra note 54.
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engage in certain additional activities could reduce the variability of bank
and BHC earnings and possibly increase their return on capital. This au-
thority could therefore help to offset the consequences of the disappearance
of the regulatory spread and the cost of augmenting capital in response to
regulatory requirements.
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON GEOGRAPHIC EXPANSION
Of the various restrictions imposed on commercial bank activities, the
branching restrictions remain the most inexplicable. Indeed, the President's
Report on Geographic Restrictions on Commercial Banks in the United
States noted that, notwithstanding the increasing ineffectiveness of prohibi-
tions against geographic expansion by commercial banks, the prohibitions
retain "an almost mystical significance" to their supporters.
56
In reviewing the history of the Douglas Amendment to the BHC Act,57
the Board in Bank of New England Corporation (CBT Corporation)18
concluded that the Douglas Amendment amounted to a "renunciation of
federal interest" in the regulation of interstate bank acquisitions. The
Douglas Amendment was, and was intended to be, no more than an
application to BHC regulation of the policy governing the branching powers
of national and state member banks reflected in the McFadden Act. 59 Thus,
notwithstanding the acrimonious debate of the issue on the national level
and the long roster of national studies devoted to it, 60 Congress has consist-
ently refused to treat bank structure as a matter of national concern,
relegating its determination largely to state law. To state this proposition is
to illuminate its irony, given the evidence of the link between banking
structure and performance and the national concern with the safety and
soundness of the banking system. 6'
A. Restrictions on Branching
Branching was not prohibited under very early American banking law.
The First and Second Banks of the United States each had branches in major
cities. Given the Treasury agency functions that the Bank of the United
56. PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 24, at 1.
57. Section 3(d) of the BHC Act prohibits acquisitions by BHCs of banks located in a
state other than that in which the BHC's banking operations are principally conducted, unless
the law of the state in which the bank to be acquired is located expressly permits such
acquisition. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982). Although referred to as the Douglas Amendment,
it was part of the BHC Act as originally enacted in 1956. See id.
58. 70 FED. REs. BULL. 374 (1984), aff'd sub. nom., NorthEast Bancorp. v. Board of
Governors, 740 F.2d 203 (2nd Cir. 1984), cert. granted - U.S. _.
59. 102 CoNO. REc. 6858 (1956), (quoted in NorthEast Bancorp., 740 F.2d at 207).
60. See PREsIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 24, at A.1-A.5 (Appendix A to chapter 1).
61. See Hawke, Continental Rescue: Is it Time to Reassess State Banking Powers,
American Banker, August 10, 1984, at 4.
[Vol.42:347
DEREGULATION OF BANKS
States exercised, however, these branches probably existed as much for the
convenience of the Government as for the convenience of customers and the
efficient operation of the bank.62 State-chartered banks of that era, including
banks owned by states, likewise maintained branches. 63 The silence of the
National Bank Act of 186464 on the issue of branching suggests that the
subject was not one of great debate at the time.65 As the power to branch
could not be inferred from the Act's silence, the Supreme Court refused to
view it as an incidental power of national banks. 66
It is not clear when the branching issue became as controversial and
contested as it is today. One might attribute opposition to branching to the
rise of agrarian politics and the populist revolt. Yet, while the rhetoric of
the controversy harks back to those days, the controversy itself appears of
more recent origin.6 7 Congress did not deal with this issue directly until 1927
when it enacted the McFadden Act, 68 which permitted branching for national
banks only within the city, town or village in which the bank was located
and then only if state law permitted state-chartered banks to maintain such
branches. At the same time, Congress made these restrictions applicable to
state-chartered member banks. 69 Indeed, although the McFadden Act started
its legislative life as a genuine effort to liberalize branching, its intended
effect when enacted was to curtail the branching powers of state member
banks rather than to give national banks significant branching powers.70 As
62. McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415, 424-5 (1819); F. REDLICH, THE
MOLDING OF AmRICAN BANKING, Part 1 113-116 (1968).
63. See Gorinson, Depository Institution Regulatory Reform in the 1980s: The Issue of
Geographic Restrictions, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 227, 238-9 (Spring 1983).
64. Act of June 3, 1864, Ch. 106, 13 Stat. 100. (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 21
et. seq. (1982)).
65. Debates during the 19th century regarding branching mainly concerned abuses such
as the "shaving shops", which were city branches of banks located in remote towns or villages
that redeemed the notes issued by the bank at a substantial discount. The National Bank Act
did deal indirectly with branch banking because it permitted a state bank converting to a
national bank charter to retain whatever branches it was then operating. 13 Stat. 484 (1864).
66. See First National Bank of St. Louis v. State of Missouri, 263 U.S. 640 (1924).
Beginning in 1922, the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) permitted limited facilities for check
cashing and deposit taking in the city or town where the national bank was located if state law
permitted state banks similar or more liberal branching. The OCC continued this practice even
after the Supreme Court's 1924 branching decision. See Fisher and Golembe, The Branch
Banking Provisions of the McFadden Act as Amended: Their Rationale and Rationality,
reprinted in REPORT OF SuBcoMlM. ON FINANCIAL INsTrUTONS OF THE SENATE CoMlI. ON
BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AA.FSAs, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., COmPENDIUf OF ISSUES RELATING
TO BRANCHING By FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 11-12 (October 1976) (hereinafter cited as COMPEN-
DIUM).
67. It is also noteworthy that many Western states, including California, adopted state-
wide branching at the very time when populist feeling was strong and influenced policy. CAL.
FIN. CODE § 500 (West 1909).
68. Act of Feb. 25, 1927, § 7, 44 Stat. 1228.
69. Id. § 9 at 1229.
70. See First National Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 257-
258 (1966).
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a result, both national banks and state member banks in states with more
liberal branching laws were at a severe competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis
non-member state banks. The Banking Act of 1933 corrected this inequity
by permitting national banks and state member banks to branch to the full
extent permitted by the law of their home states. 71
When the McFadden Act was cast in its present form by the Banking
Act of 1933, the evidence demonstrated that branch banks had fared better
than unit banks in weathering the Depression. 72 Some witnesses before the
Senate Banking Committee, particularly the Comptroller of the Currency,
urged Congress to expand modestly bank branching powers to assist banks
in meeting the adversities of the Depression. 73 Senator Glass was sympathetic
to that view, but all that the 1933 changes to the McFadden Act could
accomplish, given the continuing political opposition to branching, was
merely to assist national and state member banks in those states whose
branching laws were more liberal than the provisions of the McFadden Act
as originally enacted in 1927. The national policy of relegating the determi-
nation of banking structure to the states was preserved and even enhanced.
Given the continued, vociferous opposition to the liberalization of
branching laws, states have been slow to permit change. A majority of states
either prohibits branching entirely or severely restricts it; only a small
minority of states permits essentially unrestricted statewide branching. 74 Even
states which recently liberalized their branching laws, such as New York,
retain home office protection provisions for smaller communities. 75 Although
the issue has been debated since the 1930s, no state permits interstate
branching unconditionally, even in natural market areas which straddle state
boundaries.
76
B. Other Restrictions on Entry
Even states with the most liberal branching laws condition the granting
71. Act of June 16, 1933, §5(b), 48 Stat. 164.
72. Between 1920 and March 1933, 11,125 banks failed, or about 36% of all banks in
existence in 1921, involving 14.5% of total bank deposits. While the percentage of larger banks
that failed rose in the 1929 to 1931 period, still the bulk of the failed banks were small and the
majority were state non-member unit banks. See H. P. WiLLis AND J. M. CHAPmAN, THE
BANKING SITUATION 297-316 (1934).
73. See Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency
pursuant to S.71, 71st Cong. 3rd Sess. 2-29 (Jan. 19, 1931) (statement of J.W. Pole, Comptroller
of the Currency); Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency
on H.R. (10241) 11362, 72nd Cong. 1st Sess. 6-10 (March 14, 1932).
74. 1 FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 3106 (1984).
75. See N. Y. BANKING LAW § 105 (McKinney 1971).
76. Massachusetts permits out-of-state banks to establish Massachusetts branches if the
statute law of the banks' home states expressly authorized fully reciprocal interstate banking on
the same terms as Massachusetts. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167, § 39 (West 1984). In




of branch permits on a finding of public convenience and necessity. 7 This
requirement is intended to protect existing banks against "undue" competi-
tion from new entrants into the market, and is enforced somewhat unevenly.
It is difficult to assess how states which permit branching liberally apply
these licensing requirements. The ratios of branch offices to population in
state-wide branching states exhibit wide variations78 that are difficult to
explain, especially without making allowance for demographic variations.
Such an explanation is a task beyond the scope of this article. In any event,
application of the licensing laws to give undue protection to existing insti-
tutions could diminish substantially the beneficial competitive effects of liberal
branching laws. 79 Thus, in order to achieve more competitive local markets,
reform of the branching laws must be combined with administration of the
licensing laws to ensure that they do not create undue barriers to de novo
entry.
C. Bank Holding Company Expansion
Expansion through multi-bank holding companies is not an adequate
77. Both New York and California require a showing that the branch will promote the
public convenience and advantage, in addition to the showing of adequate capital to support
the branch operation. See, e.g., CAL. FiN. CODE § 503 (West 1983 Supp.); N.Y. BANKING LAW,
§ 29 (1971).
78. The following table shows the ratios of residents to banking offices in 1979 and 1960,
calculated from the data cited supra at note 24, for states that permitted statewide branching
in both years. States marked with an asterisk had some form of "home office protection" law
in one or both years. Such laws limit the ability of banks to establish branches in areas in which
the head office of another bank is located.
Residents Per Office
State 1980 1960 Decrease
Alaska 3361 5650 2289
Arizona 5128 7115 1986
California 5478 8981 3503
Connecticut* 4722 9494 4772
Delaware 3563 6110 2547
Hawaii 5710 6796 1086
Idaho 3589 5851 2262
Maryland 4208 8378 4171
Nevada 5549 6810 1261
North Carolina 3253 6632 3379
Oregon* 4173 7187 3014
Rhode Island 3834 8765 4931
South Carolina 4045 8329 4283
Utah* 4235 7417 3182
Vermont 2704 4382 1678
Washington* 4172 7669 3498
AVERAGE 4233 7223 2990
See supra note 24.
79. See Baker, Does Antitrust Law Preclude the Need for Geographic Constraints on
Banking, in COMPENDIUM, supra note 66, at 221, 235-236; McCall and Peterson, The Impact
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substitute for branching. Where permitted, multi-bank holding companies
offer opportunities for geographic diversification and for attaining some
efficiencies of scale. However, the evidence indicates that geographic expan-
sion by the multi-bank holding company route may be more costly and less
efficient than expansion by branching.80 In any event, although some unit
banking states, such as Texas, permit multi-bank holding companies within
the state, others do not or restrict them severely, so that even intra-state
expansion through the multi-bank holding company device is prohibited or
substantially restricted by the law of a number of states. 8'
As for interstate expansion, only two states, Maine and Alaska, permit
free entry by out-of-state BHCs; New York permits it on a reciprocal basis
only, and Delaware, Maryland, Nevada, Virginia, Nebraska, and South
Dakota permit such entry subject to restrictions designed principally to
inhibit the new entrants from becoming significant competitors for local
consumer and small business financial services.8 2 Another approach is re-
gional interstate banking, such as that adopted in New England and the
Southeast and under discussion in other regions. 83 Such arrangements permit
interstate acquisition of banks only within a region and only by BHCs that
conduct their banking operations principally within the region. It is an
approach that seems at odds with the basic notion of the United States as a
single economic entity and market. Moreover, regional interstate banking
deprives the shareholders of acquired banks of the opportunity to realize the
highest potential value of their investment, since it eliminates many bidders.
However, the concept faithfully reflects the resistance to liberalization of the
geographic restrictions on bank expansion and the policy of leaving innova-
tion in this field to the states.
This fragmented and scattered approach to the permissible geographic
scope of BHC banking activities is the result of the Douglas Amendment to
the BHC Act, s4 which, as earlier discussed, reflects the same philosophy as
the McFadden Act, namely, an abandonment of federal supremacy with
respect to this important aspect of bank structure. Recent Board decisions
made in administering the BHC Act reflect the Board's self-appointed role
as a guardian of state law restrictions on BHC interstate expansion. In
Mellon National Corporation (Heritage Bancorporation),85 the Board dealt
with a decision of the Comptroller of the Currency that the merger of Girard
Bank, a Pennsylvania-based bank, and Heritage National Bank, a New
Jersey-based bank with a branch in Philadelphia maintained since 1813, was
of De Novo Commercial Bank Entry, in ComPENDuM, supra note 66, at 499, 517-18.
80. See PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 24, at 8.
81. See ASSOCIATION OF BANK HOLDING CoMPANIEs, A PRACTICE GUIDE TO BANK ACQUI-
SITIONS AND MERGERS V1-2 to VI-5 (1983).
82. See 3 BANKING EXPANSION REP. 4-5 (Aug. 20, 1984).
83. Such regional interstate banking legislation was upheld in NorthEast Bancorp. v.
Board of Governors, 740 F.2d 203 (2nd Cir. 1984), cert. granted - U.S. _ .
84. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982); see supra note 57 (discussing § 3(d) of BHC Act).
85. 70 FED. Rs. BULL. 441 (1984), aff'd sub. nom., Girard Bank v. Board of Governors,
748 F.2d 838 (3rd Cir. 1984).
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a bank merger permissible under the McFadden Act. 86 The Board nevertheless
used the subsequent acquisition of Heritage Bancorporation by Mellon
National Corporation, an acquisition apparently necessitated only by tax
considerations, as the jurisdictional lever to declare the interstate acquisition
violative of the Douglas Amendment.1
7
Similarly, although perhaps less surprising, the Board ruled in Seattle
Bancorporation (Alaska Pacific Bancorporation) 8 that the acquisition by a
Washington-based BHC of an Alaska-based BHC violated the Douglas
Amendment. Although Alaska law permits such an acquisition, the Board
found that the transaction, as measured by relative shareholdings after the
acquisition, was in economic reality the acquisition by an Alaska BHC of a
Washington-based BHC in the face of Washington state law which prohibits
acquisitions of local banks by out-of-state BHCs except under certain very
limited circumstances 
9
Finally, the Board's decision in Old Stone Corporation, (First Federal
Savings & Loan Association)," which reiterates the Board's position that
BHCs cannot acquire savings and loan associations except under the emer-
86. Id. at 442.
87. See id. at 446. The acquisition of Heritage Bancorporation by Mellon National
Corporation was part of a step transaction, being preceded by a merger of Girard Bank into
Heritage National Bank. See id. at 442. Heritage Bancorporation technically no longer owned
a bank when it was acquired and the Board had, on prior occasions, declined jurisdiction under
§ 3 of the BHC Act in transactions that were, in effect, bank mergers subject to the Bank
Merger Act. See, e.g., Board letters to James W. Ault of May 19, 1982. Indeed, subsequent to
its Girard/Heritage decision, the Board reverted to its former position and took the astounding
view that the Board may require an application under § 3 of the BHC Act whenever a
transaction raises policy issues, but may dispense with such an application where there are none.
See Board letter to AmSouth Bancorporation of Sept. 5, 1984, reprinted in 3 BANKINO EXPANSION
REP. 15 (Oct. 1, 1984). That position is untenable. The BHC Act requires applications for
certain transactions defined in the statute, and none for those not within the definitions. See
12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1982). The Board thus had good reasons to decline jurisdiction and let
the Comptroller's decision stand. Heritage National Bank is one of only two national banks
that have branches in more than one state. The other, The Bank of California, has been
acquired by a Japanese bank. See supra note 52. These banks are grandfathered because their
multi-state branches predate enactment of the National Bank Act. Thus, the policy implications
of permitting the acquisition were minimal.
88. 70 FED. REs. BuLL. 667 (1984).
89. Id. at 669-70. Even this result is unsatisfactory. It is by no means unusual for
companies to acquire targets larger than themselves, and it is not clear how the Board would
have ruled if the companies had been more equal in size. The order illustrates clearly the
Board's hostility to interstate banking. In First Bank System, Inc. (Golden Spike State Bank),
the Board denied an application by a Minnesota-based multi-state bank holding company to
acquire a Utah bank through an intermediate BHC subsidiary owning a bank in Montana. See
First Bank System (Golden Spike State Bank), 70 FED. REs. BULL. 771 (1984). Under Utah law,
a Montana-based BHC could acquire a Utah bank, while a Minnesota-based BHC could not.
See id. at 773. Opinions of the Attorney General and the Banking Commissioner of Utah that
Utah law permitted the acquisition were part of the record before the Board. See id. Nevertheless,
the Board determined that even if the state agencies correctly interpreted Utah law, the state
statute was insufficiently explicit to meet the test of the Douglas Amendment. See id. at 774.
90. 70 FED. RES. BuLL. 593 (1984).
19851
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
gency provisions applicable only to failing thrift institutions, 9 can justifiably
be viewed as concerning geographic expansion rather than product expansion,
given the substantial equalization of bank and thrift powers in recent years.92
This denial of a small savings and loan acquisition seems incongruous in
light of the massive acquisitions of failing savings and loan associations
permitted under the emergency provisions of the Garn-St Germain Act to
Citicorp in California, Illinois and Florida93 and of the U.S. Trust94 and
subsequent decisions permitting the interstate acquisition of consumer banks.
The Board's decisions convey little sense of how the Board would like
to see the financial industry restructured, if at all. The Board is a master of
the opaque, particularly in areas that have high political visibility. The
Board's efforts to slow the "non-bank bank" movement, discussed below,
may be motivated largely by a desire to prevent the erosion of the separation
of banking from commerce and industry, a policy of long standing that
commands substantial support. Nonetheless, the Board's position cannot be
fully explained in terms of that policy and, more likely, reflects also an
91. The Board's reasoning on the issue of BHC acquisition of savings and loan associa-
tions, developed in D.H. Baldwin, 63 Fed. Res. Bull, 280 (1977), is quite tenuous. In line with
the Act's legislative history, §4(c)(8) of the BHC Act has been consistently interpreted as
imposing two, but only two, tests for BHC entry into an activity. First, the activity must be
closely related to banking, a test which the activity of a savings and loan association concededly
meets (63 FED. R.s. BULL. at 821); and second, BHC entry must result in certain defined public
benefits which outweigh certain defined possible adverse consequences. See 12 U.S.C. §1843(c)(8)
(1982); see also Nat'l Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 516 F.2d 1229, 1232-33 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (discussing two tests). Yet in D.H. Baldwin, the Board fastened on the "proper incident"
language in the "closely related" test as though it were a third test and held that the concurrent
jurisdiction of the Board and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board over BHCs owning savings
and loan associations made this activity not properly an incident of banking. See 63 FED. Rzs.
BULL. at 282, 284-286. The Board evinced no similar concern regarding Securities and Exchange
Commission jurisdiction over BHC brokerage subsidiaries. See BankAmerica Corporation (The
Charles Schwab Corporation), 69 FED. IEs. BULL. 105 (1983); 12 C.F.R. §225.25(b)(15). The
Board's position on BHC acquisitions of savings and loan associations is better explained by
the Board's strong inclination to avoid erosion of the Douglas Amendment. But this position
is inconsistent with § 4(c)(8) as construed by the courts and, in other contexts, by the Board.
It conflicts with the several consumer bank decisions of the Board in which the Board articulated
its duty to approve applications that meet the criteria for approval enumerated by the statute,
even if the result offends policy considerations the Board views as important. See infra note
98. Even if the language of § 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act is not liberalized in line with Senate action
in the 98th Congress, the Board's authority to justify denial of applications or imposition of
onerous conditions to approvals by reference to factors entirely dissimilar from the statutorily
enumerated adverse consequences remains to be litigated.
92. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1982), as amended by Title III, Part B of the Garn-St
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. The decisions of the Board which take thrift
institutions into account in analyzing the competitive effects of BHC mergers and banking
market concentrations underline this point. See, e.g., Commercial Landmark Corporation (The
First Tahlequah Corporation), 70 FED. REs. BULL. 651 (1984).
93. See Citicorp (Fidelity Federal), 68 FED. REs. BULL. 656 (1982); Citicorp (First Federal),
70 FED. REs. BULL. 149 (1984); Citicorp (Biscayne Federal), 70 FED. Ras. BULL. 157 (1984).
94. 70 FED. REs. BULL. 371 (1984), pet. for review pending, 11th Cir., Nos. 84-3269,
3270; see also infra note 98 (decisions cited therein).
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inclination in favor of geographic restrictions on banks and BHCs because
of the increase in the size of banking institutions that would accompany
geographic deregulation.
Currently, the "non-bank bank" movement represents the principal way
both for BHCs to avoid the strictures of the Douglas Amendment and for
non-banking companies to enter the banking business. The BHC Act defines
"bank" as any institution which accepts deposits that the depositor had a
legal right to withdraw on demand and that engages in the business of
making commercial loans. 95 In recent years, companies engaged in activities
other than the ownership of banks discovered that by acquiring a bank and
"handicapping" it either by having the bank not accept demand deposits or
not make commercial loans, they could avoid the reach of the BHC Act and
yet engage in banking activities, including the acceptance of insured deposits.
BHCs then realized that they could similarly avoid the prohibition of the
Douglas Amendment on interstate bank acquisitions by seeking approval
from the Board for acquisitions of such handicapped banks as non-banking
companies under section 4 of the BHC Act, to which the Douglas Amend-
ment does not apply. 96 To avoid the resistance of state agencies to such
endeavors, national bank charters can be employed for this purpose. 97
In its U.S. Trust decision, the Board acknowledged that, despite its
policy objections to this development, it had to approve such applications if
the statutory criteria of section 4 of the BHC Act were met.98 Earlier, the
Board had sought to impede this development by defining "demand depos-
its" and "commercial loans", the components of the "bank" definition in
the BHC Act, so broadly as to include NOW accounts in the former and
the acquisition of money market instruments and bank time deposits in the
95. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982).
96. See id. § 1843.
97. Attacks are being launched against these endeavors on two fronts. In Independent
Bankers Ass'n v. Conover it was claimed that the Comptroller of the Currency cannot charter
national banks which are incapable of exercising both commercial lending and demand deposit
functions. See Indep. Bankers Ass'n v. Conover, No. 84-1403 Civ.-J-12, slip op. M.D. Fla.
(1984). Reliance was placed on National State Bank of Elizabeth, N.J. v. Smith, which held
that, prior to enactment of express authorization by Congress in 1978 (Pub. L. 95-630, §1504,
92 Stat. 3713 (1978), codified in 12 U.S.C. § 27(a) (1982)), the Comptroller had no power to
charter a national bank whose activities would be confined to the exercise of trust powers. Nat'l
State Bank of Elizabeth, N.J. v. Smith, Civ. No. 76-1479, (D.N.J.), rev'd on other grounds,
591 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1979). The other line of attack is state legislation, such as that recently
enacted in Florida, which prohibits the operation in the state of any bank which does not offer
both commercial loans and demand deposits. See FLA. STAT. 658.296 (1984). Such laws raise
profound Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause issues.
98. See 70 FED. PEs. BULL. at 373. These policy concerns were more recently reiterated
in several cases. See Bankers Trust New York Corporation (Bankers Trust Company of Florida,
N.A.), 71 FED. RIEs. BULL. 51 (1985); Bank of Boston Corporation (Bank of Boston Trust
Company of Southeast Florida), 71 FED. R.s. BULL. 55 (1985); Suburban Bancorporation
(Suburban Bank Washington N.A.), 71 FED. REs. BULL. 61 (1985); see also Letter of Chairman
Paul Volcker to Senator Jake Gan of Nov. 1, 1984 (accompanying release of these orders).
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latter. 99 At the same time, it urged Congress to close this "loophole" because
of the dubious validity of its own regulatory efforts to stem the tide.' °°
Indeed, the courts invalidated these regulatory redefinitions of what consti-
tutes a "bank" for BHC Act purposes,' 0 ' and the Board faces numerous
applications by BHCs for the creation of non-bank banks. 0 2 Congress
adjourned without acting, and it is not clear whether a new Congress will be
able to deal with these issues in 1985. Thus, the "non-bank bank" route to
geographic diversification by BHCs not only has inherent functional limita-
tions and operating inefficiencies, but faces the threat of future retroactive
congressional action.' o3
V. THE ECONOMuc EVIDENCE
With the intrusion of many non-bank providers of financial services not
similarly restricted, the protection afforded to smaller local banks by the
various restrictions on entry into new geographic markets discussed above
becomes increasingly illusory. Such illusions die slowly, however, and the
political resistance to change remains vigorous. Rational analysis so far has
carried little weight.
The limited evidence gleaned from economic research suggests that
economies of scale in banking, particularly in the supply of retail banking
services, are relatively modest, although they do exist.' 0 4 Economies of scale
99. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(a) (1984), 49 Fed. Reg. 818 (1984). The Board set forth its
explanation of these regulatory changes as an appendix to the revised Regulation Y. See 49
Fed. Reg. 833-42 (1984).
100. See, e.g., 70 FED. REs. BULL. 71 (1984).
101. The Board's revised view of the definition of demand deposits was first announced
in First Bancorporation (Beehive Thrift and Loan), 68 FED. RES. BULL. 253 (1982), rev'd sub.
nom., First Bancorporation v. Board of Governors, 728 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1984). The provisions
of the revised Regulation Y reflecting the new definitions of both demand deposits and
commercial loans were invalidated in Dimension Financial Corporation v. Board of Governors,
No. 83-2696 (10th Cir. Sept. 1984), pet. for cert. granted - U.S. - (1985).
102. In order to enable the 98th Congress to deal with the issue of "non-bank banks" the
Comptroller of the Currency imposed a moratorium as of March 31, 1984 on new national
charters for "non-bank banks" until the end of the congressional session. See 43 WASH. FIN.
REP. 607 (1984). When Congress adjourned without action, the Comptroller resumed processing
applications for such charters. On November 1, 1984, the Comptroller granted applications for
29 preliminary charters and revealed that some 332 applications were pending before his office.
See Comptroller of the Currency, Press Release of Nov. 1, 1984. Subsequently, the Comptroller
approved many of these applications. See, e.g., 43 WASH. FIN. REP. 784 (1984).
103. S. 2851 would have grandfathered "non-bank banks" acquired by BHCs prior to July
1, 1983. See S. 2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104(c) (1984). The chairmen of both the House
and Senate Banking Committees have indicated that future legislative efforts to close the
"loophole" would not have a later grandfather date. See 43 WASH. FIN. REP. 571 (1984).
104. See, e.g., PRESIDENT's REPORT, supra note 24, at 13; Guttentag, Branch Banking: A
Summary of the Issues and the Evidence, in COMPENDIUM, supra note 66, at 99, 100-101; Baker,
Does Antitrust Law Preclude the Need for Geographic Restraints on Banking, in COMPENDIUM,
supra note 66, at 221, 233; Benston, The Optimum Banking Structure: Theory and Evidence,
in COMPENDIUM, supra note 66, at 458.
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achieved by larger banks have been insufficient to threaten well-managed
small, local banks.'10 How the electronic data processing and telecommuni-
cations revolution will affect this balance remains unclear; it is likely to
generate increased scale economies in certain areas,' °6 but interchange systems
and other cooperative efforts will permit smaller banks to participate fully
in these technological .developments,"°7 as they have participated in bank
credit card systems. No economic research we have noted suggests that well-
managed community banks could not survive and prosper in the more
competitive setting that the abandonment of restrictions on free entry would
engender.
Studies have found that statewide branching may lead to higher statewide
concentration ratios, with fewer banks holding larger statewide deposit
shares. 0 1 Nationwide branching may reasonably be anticipated to result in
higher concentration ratios on the national level.'0 However, the total
number of banks serving the country's financial needs is not in itself
sacrosanct." 0 To the extent that the current low concentration ratios present
on the national level and in most states are the result of artificial regulatory
restrictions on branching and BHC geographic expansion, the banking
structure that free entry would bring about is likely to produce services more
efficiently.
The market for financial services to larger corporate customers is already
essentially nationwide or broadly regional and is highly competitive. In this
market, larger banks offer most banking services throughout the nation,
105. See Rhoades, Structure-Performance Studies in Banking: An Updated Summary and
Evaluation, BoARD OF GOVERNORS OF THm FED. RESERVE SYS. STAFF STUDY No. 119 (1982).
106. For example, point-of-sale terminals, ATMs and cash management services for
corporate customers.
107. This assumes, of course, that branching law restrictions will not obstruct the ATM
interchange systems that would permit such cooperative participation by smaller banks. In
Independent Bankers Ass'n of New York State v. Marine Midland Bank, the district court held
a grocery store-owned point of sale terminal to be a branch of each bank whose debit card
holders could use the terminal. See Independent Bankers Ass'n of New York State, Inc. v.
Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 583 F. Supp. 1042 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd, No. 84-189, slip. op.
at 6 (2d Cir. 1985). The Second Circuit reversed the lower court's decision on the ground that
the ATM was not maintained by a bank. No. 84-189, slip op. at 6. Any other decision would
have substantially affected existing interchange systems such as Plus-System and Cirrus. Bills
to overturn the effect of the lower court decision were introduced but died as Congress adjourned
without action. See, e.g., S. 2898, 130 Cong. Rec. S9609-9612 (daily ed. August 1, 1984).
108. See PssmENa's REPORT, supra note 24, at Appendix 43-45, 53-54.
109. See generally, C. H. GOLEMBE & Assocs., supra note 41.
110. No one suggests that the Canadian or European model, i.e., a few very large banks
with branch systems that cover the overwhelming share of the market for banking services, is
desirable for the United States. Nor is there any prospect that completely free interstate entry
would produce such a system. However, the argument has been well made that if the total number
of banks in the United States were reduced from the present level of more than 14,000 to 100,
and if each of these banks could be patronized conveniently by all potential customers, meaning
if all banks competed throughout the United States, the choices available to consumers would
be far superior to what they are today. See Guttentag, Branch Banking: A Summary of the Issues
and the Evidence, in COMPENDrUM, supra note 66, at 107.
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using loan production offices, Edge Act subsidiaries, and correspondent
banking relationships. By contrast, competition for small business and
consumer financial services remains quite local, notwithstanding inroads
made through nationwide credit card solicitation campaigns, commercial
finance company affiliates, and other devices. There is evidence that banks
with statewide branches deliver consumer and small business services more
efficiently than do unit banks."' Thus, although the number of banks in
each state and in the nation as a whole may decline through mergers or
acquisitions under a system of liberalized branching, competition in local
markets quite likely would be enhanced, resulting in better services at a lower
price. Even the mere threat of entry under such a system would tend to lead
to improved performance." 2 The evidence suggests that a system which
permits banks to establish branches both statewide and nationwide, would
result in better, cheaper banking services. There is no evidence that such a
system would impose unacceptable risks on the federal deposit insurance
system or possess other offsetting disadvantages.
The argument against branch banking has frequently been supported by
the claim that it leads to a diversion of loanable funds from smaller towns
and rural areas to larger cities, particularly the city where the branching
bank is headquartered. The evidence does not support this claim. Indeed,
what evidence there is suggests the opposite, namely, that larger branch
banks put a higher percentage of their assets into loans than smaller unit
banks. Since statewide branch systems develop, in part, to achieve greater
diversification, this fact hardly surprises; the more diversified institutions
need not maintain liquidity reserves at levels necessary for unit banks and
they can safely commit more assets to loans. Statewide branch banking
results in greater availability of credit to local businesses and facilitates the
transfer of loanable funds from surplus to deficit areas without discrimina-
tion in favor of urban areas or headquarters cities."'
Finally, banking expansion has always had to contend with the fear of
"undue concentration of resources," a concept clearly more political than
economic in nature. Since 1970, this nebulous concept has become a statutory
criterion in the list of adverse consequences to be considered by the Board
under section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act when determining whether to permit
BHC non-bank activities. The concept looks to more than raw size." 4 It has
little to do with concentration and competition. Some fear that, if banks
were geographically deregulated, consolidations would tend to create more
111. See, e.g., Baker, Does Antitrust Law Preclude the Need for Geographic Constraints
on Banking, in ComlENDrum, supra note 66, at 221, 230-231; PRESmENT'S REPORT, supra note
24, at 145-46.
112. See PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 24, at 17-18: McCall and Peterson, The Impact
of De Novo Commercial Bank Entry, in COMPENDIUM, supra note 66, at 517-18.
113. See PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 24, at 14-15; Guttentag, Branch Banking: A
Summary of the Issues and the Evidence, in COMPENDrum, supra note 66, at 103-04.
114. See P. B. HELLER, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL BANK HOLDING CowANY LAW 269 (1976).
[Vol.42:347
DEREGULATION OF BANKS
large institutions whose economic power and influence over social and
economic policies might be enhanced by their size.
There is no obvious reason why banks and BHCs should be treated
differently from other enterprises for purposes of controlling market concen-
tration. Most observers concede that the antitrust laws generally provide
adequate protection against monopoly power and assure economic diversity
in other areas of the economy. There is no reason to assume that they would
fail to do so in the banking area. Indeed, the fact that banks now compete
with a far wider group of financial services providers would substantially
mitigate the effects of higher concentration ratios for traditional banking
activities on the state or national level. For these reasons, the concept of
"undue concentration of resources" is an emotional, not a measurable
concept." 5 It is politically potent, however, and, as noted, appears to have
found acceptance even with the Board. Yet it it hard to believe that
consumers, if clearly presented with the choice, would prefer financial
services of lower quality at a higher price for the sake of avoiding "undue
concentration of resources" and its highly emphemeral impact on the coun-
try's social and economic policies. To date, however, notwithstanding the
evidence amassed over time in support of the removal of barriers to geo-
graphic expansion by banks, Congress has given no indication that it can
arrive at a consensus in favor of change and reassert federal supremacy over
this important national issue." 6 By default, the states, subject to the same
paralyzing political pressures, are left to govern the field.
It is ironic that the downfall of Continental Illinois Corporation should
serve as an argument against geographic and product deregulation. Conti-
nental Illinois' fall was caused, first, by bad domestic commercial lending
practices, which hardly involves novel banking functions, and second, by the
fact that, as a bank in a unit banking state, Continental Illinois could acquire
no substantial stable consumer deposit base and was largely dependent on
domestic and foreign money markets, the most volatile funding sources.
Some congressional rhetoric against banking geographic and product dere-
gulation in the aftermath of the Continental Illinois affair suggests that
President Jackson's battle against the Second Bank of the United States is
very recent history indeed." 7 Such rhetoric serves only to confuse and
115. Such shibboleths mean all things to all people. As Donald Baker pointed out, perhaps
with Lewis Carroll in mind, "monopoly," to the rural unit banker secure behind legal barriers
to entry into his market, means some evil, giant bank located in a vast and distant city that
threatens his Jeffersonian values; to another it simply means the absence of effective consumer
choice, as likely represented by the market enjoyed by the Jeffersonian banker. See Baker, Does
Antitrust Law Preclude the Need for Geographic Constraints on Banking, in ComisN'ruM,
supra note 66, at 221-22.
116. The Senate's omnibus banking bill proposed in the 98th Congress again expressly
delegated to the states the power to determine bank structure, by granting authority to the
states to permit reciprocal regional BHC companies. See S.2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. title IX
(1984).
117. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REc. H1031-34 (daily ed. Feb. 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. St
Germain).
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obfuscate an important national policy issue and thus retard its resolution.
Perhaps over time, smaller banks, particularly in unit banking states,
which are the backbone of resistance to change, 1 8 will discover that compe-
tition cannot be avoided and local monopoly or oligopoly maintained by
restricting de novo geographic expansion of commercial banks. Other insti-
tutions not similarly restrained will simply take up the competitive slack.
Until this fact is both rationally and emotionally accommodated by the
banking industry, however, much valuable time will be lost. The ability of
banks to meet the challenges of deposit interest rate deregulation and of the
new market place for financial services through geographic expansion may
be severely impaired.
VI. FUNCTIONAL RESTRICTIONS
The holding company device gives banks the ability to provide a broader
range of financial services without geographic restraints, since the BHC Act
imposes no geographic restraints on BHC non-banking activities. This does
not substantially ameliorate either the geographic or the functional restric-
tions imposed on banks. Operations through multiple corporate units, as
already mentioned, tend to be less efficient and more costly. Furthermore,
without questioning the wisdom of section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act,"19
its quantitative restrictions on, and collateralization requirements for, bank
lending to affiliates impart some inefficiencies into combined bank and non-
bank operations, since two separate funding systems are required. More
importantly, the functional range of financial services that a BHC system
can offer through its non-banking units remains strictly circumscribed and,
in fact, does not add substantially to the range of services which banks can
provide directly.
The functional limitations on bank activities are of ancient lineage,
dating back at least to the charter of the Bank of England of 1694. They
did not spring from a desire to protect the public interest by assuring the
separation of banking from industry and commerce; rather, they were anti-
competitive restrictions intended to prevent banks from competing with
merchants in the sale of goods. Presumably, the restrictions were accepted
as a fair price for the monopoly on banking services granted by the charter.
When development of deposit banking by joint stock companies in the early
19th century dissipated that monopoly, the restrictions on activities remained.
The United States followed this English pattern. Banks were subjected
early on to stringent activity restrictions. The attempt to define, first in
legislative charters and later by statute, the "business of banking"' 20 and to
118. See United States v. Citizens and Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 118-19 n. 30
(1975).
119. 12 U.S.C. § 371(c) (1982).




bar entry into other activities, has been the norm of functional regulation of
banking in the United States to this day. Thus, the public interest basis for
the policy of separating banking from industry and commerce appears to be
a later rationalization of a pre-existing condition, although its strong viability
today is indisputable.'
2'
The National Bank Act of 1864,'22 patterned after the New York Free
Banking Act of 1838, attempted to give a well-defined content to "the
business of banking" and to accommodate future needs by granting the
power to engage in such other activities as might be incidental to those
specifically enumerated.' 3 Except for the additiondl restrictions added by the
Glass-Steagall Act in 1933,'2 this grant of enumerated powers dating from
another age has had to suffice for national banks adjusting to the enormous
economic, social and political changes of the last 120 years. The courts'
traditional, strict construction of the incidental powers clause has not made
this task any easier.'2 Thus, the ability of banks, particularly national banks,
to respond to changes in the marketplace by offering new services has been
relatively limited.
Even the most modest experimentation on the state level has led to
congressional criticism and threats of intervention. Both major banking bills
considered by the 98th Congress would have limited the power of the states
to permit state-chartered banks owned by BHCs to offer services which
neither national banks nor BHCs are authorized to provide. 26 That prohi-
bition was not confined to broadened activities authorized for export only,
as may be the case with the insurance powers of state banks under South
Dakota law. 27 Rather, these bills were Congress's response to the enlarged
functional powers that a number of states have given to banks under their
charter jurisdiction in various fields of endeavor, such as real estate owner-
121. See Schull, The Separation of Banking and Commerce: Origin, Development and
Implications for Antitrust, ANTrrRusT BuLL. 255, 259-65 (Spring 1983).
122. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, §8, 13 Stat. 101 (1864) (codified principally in 12 U.S.C.
§ 24 (1982)).
123. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982).
124. Sections 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act limit the underwriting powers of national
banks to U.S. Government and general obligation state and municipal securities, and prohibit
generally the cominbation of deposit-taking and securities underwriting in one institution. 12
U.S.C. § 24 (1982).
125. See, e.g., Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972); National Retailers
Corp. of Arizona v. The Valley Nat'I Bank, 411 F. Supp. 308 (D. Ariz. 1976), aff'd per curiam,
604 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1979).
126. See S. 2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104(g) (1984); H.R. 5916, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. §
6 (1984). Each bill would have prohibited the exercise of such expanded power outside the
bank's home state.
127. South Dakota law permits the acquisition of South Dakota banks by out-of-state
BHCs, if the banks so acquired do not compete significantly with local banks; it also gives
South Dakota banks the power to engage in all facets of the insurance business. See S.D. Copn,.
LAWS ANN. §§ 51-18-40 to 42 (1983). The attorney general of South Dakota has rendered an
opinion construing the statute to mitigate substantially its objectionable "for export only"
features. See Letter of Mark Meierhenry, Attorney General, of Nov. 3, 1983.
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ship and development, and the insurance, mutual funds, and travel agency
businesses. For example, the key state of New York is seriously considering
giving substantial insurance powers to its state banks. 28
Until now, the Board has disclaimed jurisdiction under the BHC Act to
regulate the activities of banking subsidiaries of BHCs and their domestic
operating subsidiaries, as long as the functional powers possessed by such
operating subsidiaries do not exceed those of the parent bank. 29 Although
the legislative history of the BHC Act fully supports this position, 30 the
Board has given some indication that it has this position under review, and
appears to favor congressional action imposing restrictions on state experi-
mentation in this respect.1 3 1 Congress has been importuned by the insurance
lobby to cut off the ability of states to expand state bank insurance powers.
3 2
Thus, even the basic tenets of the long-established dual banking system'33
cannot resist the eager onslaught of trade groups intent on keeping compe-
tition from banks at bay.
As to the range of permissible BHC non-bank activities, the regulation
listing them is lengthy and in the process of further extension. 34 Most of the
permissible activities, however, are simply traditional banking functions.
35
Of the permissible activities, only securities brokerage and the very limited
remaining insurance agency powers are likely to enhance service offerings
through existing retail branch systems of banks,136 although presently pending
128. For an excellent overview of the relevant state law, see Wallison and Tourney,
Continued Banking Deregulation Seems Inevitable, Legal Times, Mar. 5, 1984, at 14-21.
129. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d) (1984).
130. See Wallison and Tourney, supra note 128, at 16.
131. See 49 Fed. Reg. 811 (1984) (comments on adoption of § 224.22(d)); see also Financial
Services Industry-Oversight Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1983) (statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman,
Federal Reserve Board of Governors). If the recent proposal of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (49 Fed. Reg. 48,552 (1984)) is adopted, all insured banks will have to conduct
insurance underwriting and real estate development activities through subsidiaries. If the Board
then reverses its position and subjects these subsidiaries to the restrictions imposed by § 4(c)(8)
of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982)), it will have successfully blocked BHC entry
into these activities.
132. Both the Senate and House bills would extend the restrictions placed on the insurance
activities of non-bank subsidiaries of BHCs by the Garn-St Germaln Act of 1982 (12 U.S.C. §
1843(c)(8) as amended) to all holding company subsidiaries, i.e., to bank subsidiaries and their
subsidiaries. See S.2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104(d) (1984); H.R. 5916, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 2(b) (1984).
133. See Brown, The Dual Banking System in the United States, in COMPENDIUM, supra
note 66, at 239.
134. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b) (1984); 49 Fed. Reg. 9215 (1984) (for pending proposal of
additions to list of permissible activities).
135. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b) (1984).
136.The sharing of branch permises by national banks with third parties, including those
affiliated with the bank, is permissible. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.7516 (1984); see also Comptroller of




proposals may add financial planning and counseling and tax planning and
tax return preparation to this list.'
a7
With the Board's approval in BankAmerica Corporation (The Charles
Schwab Corporation) 38 of discount brokerage as a permissible non-banking
activity, a retail-oriented service of considerable potential was added to the
list of permissible non-banking activities. The unanimous affirmance of the
Board's order by the Second Circuit and by the Supreme Court underlines
the solid legal basis for the Board's decision; indeed, the activity appears
plainly permissible for national banks. 3 9 However, the final chapter in this
saga is not yet written. In the BankAmerica order, the Board stressed the
absence of advisory services and investment recommendations, apparently to
demonstrate that the brokerage activity, the buying and selling of securities
as agent on the order of customers, was not a "public sale" of securities
within the meaning of section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act. 40 The Supreme
Court's reasoning in its affirmance of the Board's order, however, makes
clear that the term "public sale", as used in section 20, means "underwrit-
ing". 4, Thus, there should be no barriers, other than the bottomless litigation
fund of the Securities Industry Association, to BHC entry into full service
brokerage. 1
42
As to the other cluster of retail-oriented financial services particularly
well suited to help depository institutions make the best possible use of
137. See proposed 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.25(20), (22) (contained in 49 Fed. Reg. 9220 (1984)).
138. See BankAmerica Corporation (The Charles Schwab Corporation) 69 FED. RES. BULL.
105 (1983), aff'd sub. nom., Securities Industry Ass'n. v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 716 F.2d 92 (2nd Cir. 1983), aff'd, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3003, 82 L. Ed.
2d 158 (1984).
139. See Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency in In re Security Pacific Discount
Brokerage (Aug. 26, 1982), and In re Union Planters Bank (Brenner Steed and Associates, Inc.)
(September 20, 1982), aff'd in relevant part sub. nom., Securities Industry Association v.
Comptroller of the Currency, 577 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd (D.C. Cir. No. 84-5085).
However, the geographic branching restrictions severely hamper full exploitation by banks of
the power to engage in discount brokerage, since the district court in Securities Industry Associa-
tion deemed bank brokerage offices to be "branches" subject to the McFadden Act. See 577
F. Supp. at 259-60.
140. See BankAmerica, 69 FED. REs. BULL. at 114; 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1984) (§ 20 of Glass-
Steagall Act).
141. See 82 L. Ed. 2d 158, 167-8.
142. Indeed, the Comptroller of the Currency has already permitted some combination of
investment advisory and brokerage services. See Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency
in In re American National Bank of Austin (Sept. 2, 1983). The validity of the decision is being
contested by the Securities Industry Association in the District Court for the District of
Columbia, but proceedings there were held in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision
in the BankAmerica (Schwab) case and the final determination of Securities Industry Ass'n. v.
Comptroller of the Currency. See 15 SEc. Rao. L. REP. 2236 (1983). Although there are no
legal obstacles to combining securities brokerage with investment advice, the Board nevertheless
appears to be concerned with such arrangements, even where the broker merely acts as a conduit
for third-party generated advice. See Fed Strives to Hold Investment Advice Line, 3 BAnING
EXPANSION REP. 17-18 (Sept. 17, 1984).
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existing branch facilities, such as insurance brokerage or agency, the law
severely restricts the ability of banks and BHCs to enter the field. 43 The
Garn-St Germain Act amendments to section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act largely
abolished the discretion the Board possessed to allow banks and BHCs
perform insurance activities, a discretion which the Board, in any event,
always exercised with considerable caution. 44 Except for certain grandfath-
ered activities, BHCs are essentially confined to performing credit life,
disability, and unemployment insurance services directly related to credit
extensions by the BHC system, and to certain severely circumscribed property
insurance agency functions that must relate to certain limited credit extensions
by finance company subsidiaries of BHCs. 145 Current efforts to bring con-
venient access to insurance services to retail customers at bank branches thus
take the distorted form of rental agreements under which third party,
unaffiliated insurance agents or brokers establish offices at bank branch
premises. 
146
Other services that present law forecloses, but which would be an
appropriate rounding out of bank services offered to local markets, include
the sale of mutual funds 47 and commingled funds for the investment of
Individual Retirement Accounts, 4 and municipal revenue bond underwriting
as a service to local government.1 49 Expanded powers to engage in venture
143. A national bank may not sell insurance other than credit life and disability insurance
in connection with its extensions of credit. See Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Insurance
Agents, 339 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968); Indep. Bankers Ass'n of America v. Heimann, 613 F.2d
1164 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980). National banks in towns with
populations of 5000 or less have broader insurance powers. See 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1982).
144. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8); BankAmerica Corporation (B.A. Insurance Company),
66 FED. Ras. BuLL. 660 (1980) (denying application to engage de novo in home mortgage life
insurance). The Board now has indicated a willingness to reconsider home mortgage life
insurance in light of the restrictions on insurance, other than credit insurance, imposed by the
Garn-St Germain Act to § 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act. See 49 Fed. Reg. 9217 (1984).
145. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982). The Export Trading Company Act permits certain
additional insurance functions relating to exports, but these are likely to be wholesale services,
offered to corporate customers and not the type of retail service that would be most valuable
to banks to offer. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(14) (1982); 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.31-34 (1984).
146. See Comptroller of the Currency Staff Interpretive Letter of December 2, 1983, FED.
BANcINo L. REP. (CCH) 85,438 (1983); see also, Bank of America Offices Offer New Product:
Insurance, American Banker, Sept. 6, 1984, at 1.
147. S. 2851, as passed by the Senate in the 98th Congress, did not propose to add this
power. See S.2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104(e) (1984). Senator Garn had intended to amend
S.2851 to include it, but was unable to accomplish this on the floor of the Senate. See 130
CONG. Rac. S9775-6 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1984).
148. The District Court for the Northern District of California held that advertising and
marketing collective investments funds for the investment of Individual Retirement Accounts
violates the Glass-Steagall Act. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover (N.D. Calif. C-84-0742,
Aug. 28, 1984). The District Court for the District of Columbia more recently has upheld the
power of banks to market such arrangements. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, D.D.C.
Civ. No. 83-0549 (Nov. 8, 1984).
149. S. 2851 would have permitted the underwriting of municipal revenue bonds through
a BHC subsidiary designated as a depository institutions securities affiliate. See S.2851, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 104(e) (1984).
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capital financing would also enhance the ability of BHCs to serve the
financial needs of small businesses. 50 Finally, the ability to underwrite
mortgage-related securities would be a valuable complement to bank mort-
gage lending activities and would augment funds available for housing by
permitting banks to generate additional loanable funds through the sale of
conventional mortgages to institutional investors.
Dispassionate consideration of the services banks and BHCs should be
able to provide without violating the separation of banking from commerce
and industry would expand their permissible service offerings, particularly
in the insurance areas. As already pointed out, the types of new services that
would permit more efficient use of existing branch systems will not increase
risk exposure and may contribute to bank and BHC earnings stability.
However, Congress, here as in the case of geographic barriers, has given
little weight to rational analysis and, giving way to pressure from various
special interest groups, appears unable to reach a workable consensus.
Without eroding the concept that banking should remain separate from
commerce and industry, the scope of financial services that banks and BHCs
should be able to supply must be redefined. This redefinition must be based
on an impartial appraisal of the nature of each service considered, its risks
and earnings potential, its capital demands, its suitability for delivery through
the branch systems banks have available, its managerial requirements, and
similar factors. The services we have mentioned; full service securities
brokerage, insurance agency and brokerage, municipal revenue bond and
mortgage-related securities underwriting, the sale of mutual funds, and
limited venture capital investments, all meet these criteria. Furthermore,
these services do not erode the separation of financial intermediation from
commercial and industrial operations. Unfortunately, there seems little pros-
pect that Congress will create a statutory framework in which banks and
BHCs can perform this range of financial services in an efficient and
productive manner. The price for the inefficiencies and distortions that the
limitations on bank and BHC diversification force banks to meet and contend
with, as well as that engendered by the new competitive environment created
by the deregulation of interest rates and the rise of non-bank financial
services competitors, is borne largely by the consumer. Ultimately, the cost
may also be borne by the deposit insurance funds, since some banks, which
150. The BHC Act prohibits the ownership by BHCs of more than 5% of the voting stock
of any company other than one engaged in activities closely related to banking as defined by
the Board. See 12 U.S.C. §1843(a) (1982). The Board has defined "voting securities" broadly
to include, among other things, preferred stock and limited partnership interests, both common
venture capital investment vehicles. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.21(1) (1984). The Board has also issued
a policy statement in the context of so-called interstate stake-out investments that beclouds the
permissible scope of such venture capital financing. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.143 (1984). The Board's
general counsel, in a private letter ruling of November 5, 1984, held that these guidelines equally
apply to stake-out investments in non-banking companies. See Letter of Michael Bradfield,
General Counsel, of Nov. 5, 1984. The ruling did not deal with venture capital type investments.
See id.
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might survive in a more accommodating regulatory environment, will fall by
the wayside.
VII. TuE RELEVANCE OF FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
Opponents of the relaxation of geographic and product restrictions
presently imposed on banks have claimed that eliminating these restrictions
would result in more bank failures, with unacceptable demands on the
federal deposit insurance fund. It is claimed that the loosening of geographic
limitations would lead to ruinous competition and thus to increased numbers
of bank failures. Similarly, it is claimed that product deregulation would
increase bank risk-taking and, given the troubled state of the banking industry
today, also result in more bank failures.
As to the impact of lifting geographic restrictions, all the existing
evidence rebuts the claim that ruinous competition and bank failures would
result. The history of the relaxation of geographic restrictions on bank
expansion suggests that expansion is largely accomplished through acquisi-
tions and consolidations, not through ruinous competition. This was true of
California in the early part of the century, of North Carolina, Virginia and
Texas later, and most recently, of Florida and Pennsylvania. Perhaps the
best evidence refuting these claims comes from New York. When statewide
branching was finally permitted and the large New York City banks expanded
into other parts of that state, the competitive outcome clearly favored the
local up-state banks. There was no evidence of competitive excesses, and
there was no drain whatsoever on the FDIC insurance fund. The evidence is
overwhelming that bank failures that impose burdens on the insurance fund
are the result of poor or dishonest management, not of ruinous competi-
tion.' California, with its statewide branching and liberal market entry
rules, has not been a heavy contributor to the roll of failing banks, and its
most spectacular bank failure in recent years was entirely the result of
mismanagement. 1
52
There is no question that the federal deposit insurance system was
designed, in part, to maintain the fragmented nature of the industry by
promoting the survival of smaller unit banks.5 3 Such banks inherently lack
the stability of banks having widely dispersed branches. Small unit banks
can draw a stable consumer and small-business deposit base only from a
narrow market. The federal deposit insurance system, however, renders this
151. See Benston, The Optimum Banking Structure: Theory and Evidence, in COMPENDIUM,
supra note 66, at 470-72.
152. The only large bank failure in California in recent years, that of the United States
National Bank of San Diego, was caused entirely by fraudulent loans to insiders and their
business affiliates.
153. The objective of a highly fragmented banking system still retains considerable vitality.
In June, 1984, a member of the House Banking Committee introduced remarks into the
Congressional Record vigorously supporting this objective. 130 CoNG. REc. E2622, (1984)
(statement of Rep. Vento).
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inherent instability unimportant for most depositors. Deposit insurance also.
makes it possible for such banks to fund themselves from sources beyond
their service area through means such as brokered deposits. These remote
funding sources are highly volatile, however, and may impair significantly
the bank's ability to manage its liquidity wisely.' 54 Moreover, the smaller
unit bank is necessarily subject to a geographic concentration of assets, as
its service area for loans to individuals and small and medium-sized businesses
tends to be confined to the service area of its single office. Deregulation of
deposit interest rates may undermine further the stability of smaller unit
banks. For these reasons, it appears likely that maintaining the geographic
limitations in the face of deposit interest rate deregulation will result in
higher demands on the federal deposit insurance fund. As interest rate
deregulation has increased the risk to the fund, geographic deregulation
could help to reduce it.
It is also argued that increased concentration, the emergence of a smaller
number of larger banks as the result of free interstate branching or holding
company expansion, will create the necessity for more massive federal rescue
efforts comparable to those arranged for Continental Illinois Corporation,
as more banks reach a size where, in defense of the banking system as a
whole, the Government cannot permit their failure. 5 5 The additional conten-
tion is made that this perception gives the very large banks an unfair
advantage over their smaller competitors, at least in terms of the cost of
.funds.5 6 Such a perception can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, but it need
not and should not be permitted to endure. In light of the acrimonious
debate in Congress and elsewhere over the Continental Illinois rescue, and
the wide-spread perception of that action's unfairness to uninsured depositors
of smaller banks which have not been protected by the federal regulators,
Congress soon must address this issue.
With adequate Federal Reserve support, the failure of even a very large
bank need not endanger the banking system as a whole nor disrupt the
functioning of the payments system and the implementation of monetary
policy. Even in the case of Continental Illinois, steps might have been taken
that would have substantially eased the impact of a failure of that organi-
154. The FDIC and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) have
attempted to control the exposure of the deposit insurance funds caused by the practice of retail
deposit brokerage. For the views of the FDIC and FSLIC on the dimensions of this problem,
togetfier with the counter arguments, see Discussion of Issues Raised by Commenters on a
Regulation Governing Deposit Brokerage, 49 Fed. Reg. 13003, 13005-07 (1984). The Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia enjoined the FDIC and FSLIC from implementing
the final rule. See 49 Fed. Reg. 27295 (1984), aff'd, FAIC Securities v. United States, No. 84-
5408, slip. op. at (D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 1985).
155. See Testimony of C.T. Conover, Comptroller of the Currency, before the House
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. (Sept. 19, 1984); see also
N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1984, at D1 (reporting testimony of C.T. Conover); American Banker,
Sept. 20, 1984, at 1 (same).
156. See Shull, New Antitrust Constraints for the Era of Bank Deregulation, American
Banker, Aug. 24, 1984, at 4, 6.
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zation on the banking system and the payments system.1 57 While the evidence
is contested by the FDIC, and while hindsight can justifiably be viewed with
suspicion, evidence collected by the staff of the House Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs suggests that only six banks would
have been rendered insolvent by liquidation of Continental Illinois National
Bank. 51 If this is so, the Federal Reserve System and the FDIC could readily
have helped these smaller banks survive the liquidation of their correspond-
ent. Whatever difficulties the FDIC might have encountered pale beside the
implications of the nationalization of Continental Illinois that resulted from
the rescue. If additional statutory authority for the Federal Reserve System
is required, the Board should seek it.
For all of these reasons, revision of the deposit insurance system is an
urgent matter. In its report to Congress required by the Garn-St Germain
Act, the FDIC recommended legislation allowing the insurance assessment
to vary somewhat to reflect the riskiness of each insured bank. 5 9 The report
also recommended consideration of the possibility of private participation in
providing deposit insurance.160 These revisions to the deposit insurance system
itself would be coupled with increased, standardized financial disclosures by
banks.161
The FDIC acknowledges, however, that there are significant conceptual
and practical difficulties to implementing the proposals. 62 It is unclear
whether the FDIC can measure the riskiness of a bank with sufficient
accuracy and timeliness to justify a variable deposit insurance premium. To
be a significant deterrent to management risk-taking practices, an increase
in the insurance assessment would have to significantly reduce bank earnings
per share. However, the impact of the assessment increase on the earnings
of a troubled bank might itself disturb the bank's safety and soundness.
There is also the question of timing. To be an effective deterrent to
disfavored actions, the increase in the insurance premium must be levied at
the time bank management decides to engage in the disapproved behavior.
As a practical matter, the premium increase proposed by the FDIC would
157. The FDIC, perhaps with Federal Reserve assistance, could have implemented the
"partial payoff" technique with Continental Illinois. See infra note 167.
158. See Testimony of William Isaac, Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration, before the House Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 2d Sess.
(Oct. 4, 1984); see also N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1984, at 37 (reporting testimony of William Isaac);
Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1984, at 8 (same).
159. FDIC, DEPOSIT INSURANCE IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT (1984) (report submitted
pursuant to § 712 of the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982). For discussion
of the variable insurance premium, see Chapter II.
160. Id. at VII-I.
161. Id. at IV-1. The federal banking regulators have already moved toward increased
disclosure. The FDIC recently solicited comments on a voluntary disclosure scheme for insured
non-member banks. See 49 Fed. Reg. 26809 (1984). The OCC issued an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking seeking advice on the most effective way to develop a compulsory
disclosure system. See 49 Fed. Reg. 28566 (1984).
162. FDIC, supra note 159, at xiv.
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occur only after bank examiners have discovered that the disapproved risk
had been taken. Increasing the assessment after the risk has been taken
further weakens the bank.
Most importantly, announcement of an increase in a bank's insurance
assessment might cause a run on that bank. Uninsured depositors would
simply avoid a bank paying a higher insurance premium in favor of any
bank that the FDIC has categorized as less risky, unless the riskier bank
offers a sufficiently higher return to compensate for the special risk. For this
reason, a "silent run" by uninsured depositors might occur after announce-
ment of an increase in the deposit insurance premium, unless the institution
significantly increased the deposit interest rates it offers. This increase in the
cost of funds may hasten its doom.
The FDIC Chairman recently suggested, apparently independently of the
proposal for a variable insurance premium, that insured banks be required
to increase their capital to 9 petcent of total assets, with a large proportion
of that requirement eligible to be met by subordinated debt. 63 A capital level
of 9 percent would place a somewhat greater cushion between the insured
depositors (and thus the deposit insurance fund) and the risk-taking activities
of the bank. However, no market exists for the subordinated debt of most
banks. Although a market might develop, this source of "capital" might be
very expensive. In addition, this mandated capital structure for banks and
BHCs would create all of the problems of regulatory capital requirements that
we have identified earlier.
Rather than requiring additional capital or varying the insurance pre-
mium, the authors believe that the historic purposes of deposit insurance
would be promoted more effectively by reducing the level of insured deposits
to $40,000 per account, the level that prevailed prior to enactment of the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. '
4
The increase to $100,000 per account was enacted by Congress without
hearings or committee consideration, and little or no debate preceded this
significant step. 65 Congress placed no additional funds at the disposal of the
insurance funds to match the 250 percent increase in their potential liability.
Reducing the coverage per account would both limit the aggregate
liability of the deposit insurance system and make a merger and assumption
of liabilities less likely to be the most cost-effective technique for the FDIC
to use in dealing with a failing bank. 66 Thus, the FDIC would revert to
carrying out its original mandate: to pay off the insured depositors and
163. FDIC Soft-Pedals Bank-Discipline Plans, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1984, at 14.
164. Pub. L. No. 96-221, (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3501-24 (1982)).
165. See HousE CoNp. REp. No. 842, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 78, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 236, 308 (accompanying H.R. 4986); SENATE CoNF. REP. No. 640,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 78, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 236, 308 (same).
166. C.H. GOLEMBE AND D.S. HOLLAND, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING 1983-84 50
(1983).
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liquidate the bank. Except in the most unusual circumstances, it should be
compelled to do so even in the case of large banks.
In order to limit the consequences of such liquidations for the payments
mechanism and the national economy, the FDIC should resume making
prompt partial pay-outs to uninsured depositors, as it was doing on an
experimental basis prior to the rescue of Continental Illinois Corporation.
167
Since uninsured depositors would be placed at greater risk and more deposits
would be uninsured, depository institutions with significant uninsured de-
posits should comply with the same financial disclosure rules that apply to
BHCs subject to SEC regulation.6 8 The steps just outlined would strengthen
the deposit insurance funds until bank and BHC geographic and product
diversification could stabilize the industry.
VIII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons developed in the foregoing, the authors believe that
political resistance to necessary changes in bank structure and function must
be broken if the banking system is to be kept intact in the face of the many
difficulties that beset it. Congress, confronted by confused and discordant
outcries of self-interest from many different groups, has been unable to
reach any consensus.
The burden to make the case for coherent change must thus fall on the
bank regulators, particularly on the Board, as the most prestigious and, at
least in the perception of Congress, the most dispassionate, expert body on
the nation's banking system. The evidence supporting relaxation of both
functional and geographic restrictions is strong, as is the urgency of resolving
this issue. The Board is best able to demonstrate convincingly to Congress
the interrelationships sketched in this article between these restrictions and
the issues of deposit insurance, bank performance, and the safety and
soundness of the banking system. If that were done, Congress would find it
difficult to ignore the need for change. The Continental Illinois debacle
presented a unique opportunity to make the case for the assumption of
federal responsibility for the branching issue, but that opportunity was lost
amid strident recriminations. The case for reasoned, functional deregulation
should not require any such destructive examples.
Failure to act wisely and expeditiously will, over time, result in a banking
167. The EDIC recently conducted an experiment with "partial payoff", under which
uninsured depositors received in cash immediately the percentage of their deposit that the FDIC
estimated they would recover upon final liquidation of the failed bank. See FDIC Analysis of
Modified Payoffs May Not Be Ready for Several Months, DAiLY REP. FOR ExacuTnas (BNA)
No. 208, at A-17 (Oct. 26, 1984). The FDIC issued "receivers certificates" to the uninsured
depositors for the remainder of their deposits. If the FDIC recovers more than it estimated,
dividends will be paid on the receivers certificates, up to their face amounts; if the FDIC
recovers less, it will bear the loss. This technique was used approximately nine times during the
period of the experiment. The experiment ended shortly before the federal banking regulators
arranged financing for Continental Illinois Corporation. See id.
168. See SEC Release 33/6458, 48 Fed. Reg. 11113 (1983).
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system more and more removed from the realities of the marketplace in
which it is supposed to function. Non-bank competitors, free of the increas-
ingly archaic restraints that govern banks, will exploit the most lucrative
market opportunities in the financial services sector as such opportunities
present themselves. The profitability of banks, and thus the soundness of
the banking system, will decline. Implementation of the Board's monetary
policy through a shrinking banking system may become more difficult.
Finally, the deposit insurance funds and indirectly, the American taxpayer,
will be forced to contribute more frequently to the effort to pick up the
pieces of bank failures that prudent and timely congressional action might
have avoided.

